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Abstract:
Traditional merger analysis, based on market definition and use of concentration measures to infer potential
anti-competitive effects, is problematic and difficult to implement when evaluating mergers in industries with
differentiated products. This paper discusses an alternative which consists of a front-end estimation of
demand and back-end use of a model of post-merger conduct to simulate the competitive effects of a
merger. I discuss and demonstrate the use of different methods of estimating demand. Furthermore, I show
how the estimated demand parameters can be used to compute the post-merger price equilibrium (rather
than just an approximation to it) and changes in welfare. The methodology is applied to two recent mergers
and two hypothetical mergers in the ready-to-eat cereal industry. The results clearly demonstrate the
importance of the model used in front-end estimation and the computation of equilibrium in determining the
competitive effects of a merger.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Traditional policy towards analysis of mergers is primarily structural.  Markets are 
defined, markets shares of the relevant firms are used to compute a concentration measure, which
gives rise to presumptions of illegality.  Using this approach to evaluate mergers in industries with
differentiated, or closely related but not identical, products is problematic. In many cases the
product offerings present a continuum, making a definite distinction between “inside” and
“outside” goods impossible.  Furthermore, even if a market can be defined the computed
concentration index provides a reasonable standard by which to judge the competitive effects of
the merger only if the products are equally spaced in some attribute space.
In order to deal with these challenges a new methodology to evaluate mergers has
developed (see for example, Baker and Bresnahan, 1985; Hausman. Leonard and Zona, 1994; or
Werden and Froeb, 1994).  The basic idea consists of “front-end” estimation, in which demand for
the products is estimated, and a “back-end” analysis, in which the demand elasticities are used to
simulate the competitive effects of the merger.  This paper presents this methodology and uses it
to evaluate actual, and hypothetical, mergers in the ready-to-eat cereal industry. It contributes to
the existing literature in several ways.  
First, in the traditional merger analysis it is widely accepted that the market definition
generally determines the outcome of the case.  Equivalently, the outcome of the back-end
simulation is largely determined by the front-end estimation of demand.  Fortunately, the debate
over the demand estimation can be based on science.  Surprisingly, however, most of the
discussion of the new methodology has focused on the back-end simulations rather that on the
front-end estimation (see Werden, 1997).  Using newly developed methods for estimating demand
for differentiated products and aggregate point of sales scanner data I discuss and demonstrate the2Note that in analysis of mergers we can restrict out attention to those products that are produced by the
merging parties, which might be a smaller sub-set.  This is the logic behind the analysis of Baker and Bresnahan
(1985).  In some cases, however, this sub-set might still be large.
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different options for the front-end estimation.  The empirical results clearly demonstrate the
importance of the choice of estimation method.
Second, unlike previous work I demonstrate how estimates the demand function can be
used to compute the post-merger equilibrium rather than an approximation to it.  The results
show that in some cases the approximation works well while in others the result is different from
the true equilibrium outcome.  Figuring out how well the approximation does is harder than
computing the true predicted post-merger equilibrium.
Finally, the model presented here has the clear advantage over alternative methods in
translating the changes in equilibrium prices to consumer well-being.  The demand system is
derived from indirect utility curves of heterogenous consumers and therefore the parameters can
be used directly to simulate not the just the change in prices, but the change in consumers utility.
Estimation of demand has been a central concern of applied economists for several
decades.  In industries with differentiated products the task is much harder because of the large
number of parameters to be estimated.  To be more specific, suppose we have 200 differentiated
products (as in the RTE cereal industry), then assuming constant elasticity demand curves
implies estimating 40,000 price elasticities.  Even if we impose restrictions implied by economic
theory, the number of parameters will still be too high to estimate with any reasonable data set.
2  
One solution to this problem is given by the discrete choice literature (for example see
McFadden, 1973, 1978, 1984; Cardell, 1989; Berry, 1994; Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995, or
Nevo, 1997b).  Here the dimensionality problem is solved by projecting the products onto a4
space of characteristics, making the relevant dimension the dimension of this space and not the
square of the number of products.  Some of the models in this class are very restrictive in nature
(for example the Logit or Antitrust Logit models) and should be used with caution in simulating
mergers.  The model used in this paper belongs to this class of models but is flexible and yields
reasonable substitution patterns. 
An alternative to discrete choice methods is given by Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994)
and Hausman (1996), which demonstrate the use of  a multilevel demand model to estimate
demand for differentiated products.  The essential idea is to use aggregation and separability
assumptions to justify different levels of demand. The top level is the overall demand for the
product category (for example RTE cereal).  Intermediate levels of the demand system, model
substitution between various market segments, for example, between kids cereals and natural
cereals.  The bottom level is the choice of a brand within a segment.  Each level of the demand
system can be estimated using a flexible functional form.  This segmentation of the market reduces
the number of parameters proportionally to the inverse of the number of segments. Therefore,
with either a small number of brands or a large number of (a priori) reasonable segments this
method can use flexible functional forms (for example the Almost Ideal Demand System of
Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a) to give good first order approximations to any demand system. 
However, as the number of brands in each segment increases, beyond a handful, this method
becomes less feasible.  Section 3 provides a comparison of the multilevel demand model and the
method employed in this paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the traditional merger
analysis as it is described in the merger guidelines.  Section 3 presents the new methodology for
evaluating the effects of mergers.  An emphasis is placed on the front-end estimation.  The3See Werden (1992a), for a history of market delineation, and Werden (1992b) for some practical
suggestions.
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methodology is applied to the ready-to-eat cereal industry and the results presented in Section 4. I
conclude with a discussion in Section 5.
2.  TRADITIONAL MERGER ANALYSIS AND THE MERGER GUIDELINES
Section 7 of the Clayton Act states that a merger is prohibited if its likely effect will be “to
substantially lessen competition.”  The Merger Guidelines indicate the situations under which the
Department of Justice is likely to challenge a merger, or acquisition, under section 7.  The 1968
guidelines rely, almost exclusively, on measures of market concentration in order to accomplish
this goal, without detailing how the relevant market should be measured. 
In contrast, the 1982 and 1984 guidelines are more detailed, and attempt to rely on
economic theory (see Willig, 1991).  The process defines a set of discrete analytic steps.  First, the
relevant market is determined by establishing the smallest set of products for which a hypothetical
monopolist would profitably impose a “small but significant and non-transitory increase in price”
(abbreviated to SSNIP).  A SSNIP is usually taken to be a 5% increase in price.  In a merger by
two parties this is done by first considering the products of the two firms, and then adding the
products of their competitors until a set of products that imposes a SSNIP is found
3.
The next step is to determine the potential “players” in this market.  All firms that
currently produce and sell in the market will be included, as will firms with potential production
capabilities.  How the latter is defined is not always clear.  For each of these firms the market
share of sales (or in some cases capacity) is determined.  A measure of concentration is computed,4 The HHI is the sum of the squares of market shares, which are measured in percentage, and therefore
will vary between 0 and 10,000.  For an axiomatic treatment of this index see Encaoua and Jacquemin (1980).
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typically the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
4.  The general standards are that a horizontal
merger will not be challenged if the post-merger HHI is below 1,000.  If the post-merger HHI is
between 1,000 and 1,800, mergers that increase the HHI by less than 100 points will usually not
be challenged, and otherwise the decision will be based on a variety of other considerations. 
When the post-merger is over 1,800 a 50 points increase will be the threshold for challenging a
merger. Finally, additional factors, such as entry or increased production efficiency, are
considered (see Willig, 1991, for details).
The logic behind these standards is that a merger in an unconcentrated industry, or a
merger that raises concentration only slightly, is not likely to have anti-competitive effects.  There
is no attempt, in the 1984 guidelines, to quantify the mechanism through which these effects
occur.   For the analysis of competition in differentiated products this process is somewhat
problematic.  Willig (1991, pg. 299-305) notes that if demand follows the restrictive Logit model,
then relying solely on market shares, to determine merger policy, is sensible.  But this is no
surprise; in the Logit model all substitutions patterns are determined solely by the market shares. 
I will claim below, and empirically demonstrate, that for the ready-to-eat cereal industry a Logit
model of demand is inadequate and can lead to the “wrong” conclusions.  Therefore, in analyzing
mergers in a differentiated products industry, like the cereal industry, the traditional structural
approach does not stand on sound ground.
The applications of the traditional structural approach, as the approach previously
described has been termed, to differentiated products is problematic not only from the theoretical
view.  Due to consumer heterogeneity it is easy to argue that many products should be included in5 For example, in the case of New York vs. Kraft General Foods, Inc. both sides used estimates of demand
elasticities. 
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the relevant market.  For example, when examining ready-to-eat cereal one might claim that hot
cereal and bagels are “close” substitutes, at least for some consumers, and should therefore be
included in the relevant market.  The result is that the market can be defined broadly and the
resulting market shares are small.
The 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines have made improvements in the analysis of the
competitive effects of mergers.  A separate discussion is dedicated to unilateral effects (i.e.,
effects not involving collusion) of mergers in differentiated products industries. Shapiro (1996,
pg. 24) summarizes the implementation of the guidelines: 
“(1) Consider a price increase for brand A of, say, 10%.  Try to measure what
fraction of the sales lost by brand A due to the price increase would be captured by
brand B.  I call this fraction the Diversion Ratio (from Brand A to Brand B).
(2) Based on pre-merger Gross Margins and the estimated Diversion Ratio,
calculate the post-merger price increase, assuming no synergies or rival supply
responses.
(3) Try to account for any likely and timely changes in prices or product offerings
by non-merging parties, including product repositioning and entry.
(4) If there are credible and documented synergies that lower marginal costs,
reduce the predicted post-merger prices accordingly.”
In practice the Guidelines’ facilitated a  methodology of using estimated own and cross-price
elasticities in analyzing mergers
5.
The use of econometric estimates in merger analysis has gone an additional step forward6See Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) or Werden and Froeb (1994). 
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by using not just the raw estimates (or a diversion ratio), rather the price increases that would
result from the merger are computed.  Typically, this will involve computing an approximation to
the price increase for the products of the merging firms.
6  Typically, such a practice is justified by
a so called, Nash-Bertrand assumption.  However, the predicted post-merger prices are not the
new equilibrium prices.  The next section shows not only how the post-merger equilibrium can be
computed, but also how the simulations can be translated into change in consumer well-being.
3.  SIMULATING THE EFFECTS  OF A MERGER
The general strategy in simulating a merger in a differentiated products industry consists
of several steps.  First, elasticities of demand are estimated.  Second, marginal costs are recovered
either by estimation (potentially jointly with the demand parameters in the first step) or  by using
the estimated demand elasticities and assuming a model of pre-merger pricing conduct. Third, the
new price equilibrium is computed using estimated demand and marginal costs, and assuming a
model of post-merger pricing conduct.  Finally, effects of the merger on non-price competition are
taken into account.
3.1 Step 1: Estimating Demand for Differentiated Products
The first step in computing the effects of a merger, sometimes called the front-end,  is
estimating demand.  This step is not only the most difficult, from an econometric view point, but
also is important in determining the outcome of the next several steps.  Its importance parallels
that of the market definition in the traditional merger analysis. Different methods are surveyed
below, and some are applied to data in the next section.  Issues regarding the actual estimation,9
q’D(p;r)
data requirements and an empirical comparison between these methods is beyond the scope of
this paper.  The interested reader is referred to Nevo (1997a, 1997c) for a careful discussion of
all these empirical issues.
The Problem
Probably the most straight-forward approach to estimating a demand system is to specify a
system of demand equations
where q is a J-dimensional vector of quantities demanded from the J commodities,  p is a  J-
dimensional vector of prices of the commodities, and r is a vector of exogenous variables that
shift demand.  The main concern of previous work was to specify D(@) in a way that was both
flexible and consistent with economic theory.  Such methods include: the Linear Expenditure
model (Stone 1954), the Rotterdam model (Theil, 1965; and Barten 1966), the Translog model
(Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau, 1975), and the Almost Ideal Demand System (Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980a).
The problem in applying any of these methods to estimate demand for differentiated
products is the dimensionality problem.  Due to the large number of products, even if we were to
assume a very simple and restrictive functional form for the demand function, D(@), the number of
parameters will be too large to estimate.  For example, a linear demand system,  where D(p)’Ap,
A is J×J matrix of constants, implies J
2  parameters.  The number of parameters can be reduced
by imposing symmetry of the Slutsky matrix and adding up restrictions.  However, the basic
problem still remains: the number of parameters to be estimated increases with square the number
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Solutions
Solutions to the problem, discussed above, include:  (1) symmetric representative
consumer models, (2) multi-stage budgeting and (3) discrete choice/address models.  This section
presents these methods and shows how they solve the dimensionality problem.
3.1.1 Symmetric Representative Consumer Models
A widely used specification in theoretical models of product differentiation is the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function used by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence 
(1976).  The CES utility function takes the form
where   is a constant parameter that measures substitution across products.  The demand of the
representative consumer obtained from this utility function is
where I is the income of the representative consumer.  The dimensionality problem is solved by
imposing symmetry between the different products; thus, estimation involves a single parameter,
regardless of the number of products, and can be achieved using non-linear estimation methods. 
However, the symmetry condition is restrictive and indeed for this model implies 
The cross-price elasticities are restricted to be equal, regardless of how “close” the products are in
some attribute space.  This restriction can have important implications for the simulation of
mergers and in many cases would lead to the “wrong” conclusions.7Note, that here aj  is equivalent to  , using the notation of Section 3.1.3. j
8In the theoretical literature (for example, Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992) this term will be
multiplied by a positive parameter that captures the relative importance of the variety-seeking behavior.  As this
parameter goes to zero variety is not valued and one product is purchased by the representative consumer (i.e.,
there is no heterogeneity in the population); while as this parameter goes to infinity consumption is divided equally










An alternative to the CES utility function is 
which as shown by Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) yields the Logit demand.  Estimation
of this model involves J parameters and allows for somewhat richer substitution patterns. 
However, as discussed below the substitution patterns in the  Logit model are solely a function of
market shares (which here are equivalent to the quantities consumed by the aggregate consumer),
and are not related to the characteristics of the products.  Or in other words, due to the aggregate
IIA property if the price of commodity i increases the representative consumer will keep the same
ratio  , for all j,kßi, instead of consuming relatively more of products that are similar to qj/qk
product i.
The utility function for the Logit representative consumer has two terms.  The first
suggests that the representative consumer will consume only the product with the highest aj.
7  The
second term is an entropy term and expresses a variety-seeking behavior.
8  Through this second
term we get consumption of more than one product, but its functional form illuminates the
similarity between the aggregate IIA property and the symmetry condition embodied in the CES
utility:  all products enter this entropy term in a symmetric way.
In summary, models of this class solve the dimensionality problem by imposing symmetry
conditions which implicitly suggest an extreme form of non-localized competition.  Although for12
U(q1,q2,...,qJ) ’ f[v1(q1,q2),v2(q3,q4),...,vG(qJ ),...,qJ)],
some industries this model of differentiation is adequate, for most markets this is not the case. 
3.1.2 Separability and Multi-Stage Budgeting
A different approach to solving the dimensionality problem is to divide the products into
smaller groups and allow for a flexible functional form within each group.  The justification of
such a procedure relies on two closely related ideas: the separability of preferences and multi-
stage budgeting.
The first notion is that of (weak) separability of preferences.  If this holds commodities can
be partitioned into groups so that preferences within each group are independent of the quantities
in other groups.  For example, the utility function can be written as
where f(@) is some increasing function and  are the sub-utility functions associated with the v1,...,vG
separate groups.  The groups could be broad categories such as food, shelter and entertainment,
and each group can possibly be divided into one or more sub-grouping. 
A slightly different notion is that of multi-stage budgeting.  This occurs when the
consumer can allocate total expenditure in stages; at the highest stage expenditure is allocated to
broad groups, while at lower stages group expenditure is allocated to sub-groups, until
expenditures are allocated to individual products.  At each stage the allocation decision is a
function of only that group total expenditure and prices of commodities in that group (or price
indexes for the sub-groupings).  All these allocations must equal those that would occur if the
maximization was done in one complete information step.
The two notions, of weak separability and multi-stage budgeting, are closely related;
however, they are not identical, nor does one imply the other.   Weak separability is necessary and
sufficient for the last stage of the multi-stage budgeting; if a subset of products appears only in a13
separable sub-utility function, then the quantities demanded of these products can always be
written as only a function of group expenditures and prices of other products within the group. 
The higher stages, the allocation of expenditures between groups, are more problematic and have
to rely on the composite commodity theorem (Hicks, 1936; or Leontief, 1936), on various
restrictions on preferences, or on stronger notions of separability (see Gorman, 1959; or Deaton
and Muellbauer, 1980b chapter 5).  From an empirical point of view the most useful of these
theorems is the requirement (1) that the indirect utility functions for each segment are of the
Generalized Gorman Polar Form, and (2) that the overall utility is separable additive in the sub-
utilities.
Originally, these methods were developed for the estimation of fairly broad categories of
products.  Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994) and Hausman (1996) use the idea of multi-stage
budgeting to construct a multi-level demand system for differentiated products.   The actual
application involves a three stage system: the top level corresponds to overall demand for the
product (beer or ready-to-eat cereal, in their applications); the middle level involves demand for
different market segments (for example, family, kids and adults cereal); and the bottom level
involves a flexible brand demand system corresponding to the competition between the different
brands within each segment.
For each of these stages a flexible parametric functional form is assumed.  The choice of
functional form is driven by the need for flexibility, but also requires that the conditions for multi-
stage budgeting are met.  A typical application has the AIDS model (see Deaton and Muellbauer,


















where sjct is the dollar sales share of total segment expenditure,  ygct is overall per capita segment
expenditure, Pgct is the price index and pkct is the price of the kth brand in city c at quarter t.  This
system defines a flexible functional form that can allow for a wide variety of substitution patterns
within the segment.  It has two additional advantages over other flexible demand systems (like the
Rotterdam system or the Translog model): (1) it aggregates well over individuals; and (2) it is
easy to impose (or test) theoretical restrictions, like adding-up, homogeneity of degree zero and
symmetry (for details see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980a). 
The price index, Pgct, is computed as either the Stone logarithmic price index 
or the Deaton and Muellbauer exact price index
The exact form of the price index does not seem to be very important for the results (see Deaton
and Muellbauer, 1980a pg 316-317).  If the latter is used the estimation is non-linear, while with
the Stone index the estimation can be performed using linear methods.
The middle level of demand captures the allocation between segments and can be modeled
using the AIDS model, in which case the demand specified by equation (1) is used with both
expenditure shares and prices aggregated to a segment level (the prices are aggregated using
either equations (2) or (3)).  An alternative is the log-log equation used by Hausman, Leonard,
and Zona (1994) and Hausman (1996):9Instead of using the notion of exact two-stage budgeting one can rely of approximate two-stage
budgeting. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980b, pg.  132-133) show that for the Rotterdam model approximate two-
stage budgeting implies that the higher stages also have a Rotterdam functional form, but require two price indexes
to sum the price in each group.  They claim that in practice these indexes are collinear and therefore can be treated





klog kct% gc% gct;
g’1,...,G, c’1,...,C, t’1,...,T,
logqct’ 0% 1logyct% 2log ct%Zct % ct
where qgct is the quantity of the gth segment in city c at quarter t, yRct is total ready-to-eat cereal
expenditure, and  kct are the segment price indexes (computed using either equations (2) or (3)).
Since the lower level of the demand system is the AIDS, which satisfies the Generalized
Gorman Polar Form (GGPF), the preferences of the second level should be additively separable
(i.e., overall utility from ready-to-eat cereal should be additively separable in the sub-utilities from
the various segments), in order to be consistent with exact two-stage budgeting.
9  Neither the
second level AIDS, nor the log-log system satisfy this requirement.  Also, in order for exact multi-
stage budgeting to hold to the next level of aggregation these preferences should be of the GGPF. 
Finally, at the top level the demand for the whole ready-to-eat cereal category is specified
as 
where qct is the overall consumption of cereal in city c at quarter t, yct  is real income,   ct
is the price index for cereal and Zct are variables that shift demand (demographics and time factors). 
We note that this does satisfy additive separability, which is required for exact two-stage
budgeting.
3.1.3 Discrete Choice Models











i ’ % Di% vi , vi~ N(0,IK%1), (5)
which model products as bundles of characteristics.  Preferences are defined over the
characteristics space, making the dimension of this space the relevant dimension for empirical
work. 
I focus on a particular specification which includes, with small changes, most of the
specifications used in previous work.  In this specification, the conditional indirect utility of
consumer i from product j in market t is
10
where xjt is a K-dimensional vector of observable characteristics of product j, pjt is the price of 
product j in market t, >j is the national mean of the unobserved (by the econometrician) product
characteristics, )>jt is a market specific deviation from this mean, and gijt is a mean zero stochastic





The distribution of consumer taste parameters is a function of individual characteristics,
which consist of demographics that are observed and additional characteristics that are
unobserved, denoted Di and vi respectively. I model the distribution of consumers taste
parameters for the characteristics as multi-variate normal (conditional on demographics) with a
mean that is a function of demographic variables and parameters to be estimated, and a variance-








iK) ’( , 1,..., K)
dimension of the observed characteristics vector; therefore,
where Di is a d×1 vector of demographic variables, A is a (K+1)×d matrix of coefficients that11Alternatively, one could think of a composite “error” term,  , which is distributed   and   is v
(
i N(0, ()
the Cholesky factorization of 
*.
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ui0t’ 0% 0Di% 0vi0% i0t .
uijt’xjt & pjt% j% jt% ijt, i’1,...,It j’1,...,J, t’1,...,T. (6)
measure how the taste characteristics vary with demographics, and E is a scaling matrix.
11 
The specification of the demand system is completed with the introduction of an "outside
good"; the consumers may decide not to purchase any of the brands.  Without this allowance a
homogenous price increase (relative to other sectors) of all the products does not change
quantities purchased.  The indirect utility from this outside option is
The mean utility of the outside good is not identified (without either making more assumptions or
normalizing one of the "inside" goods); thus, I normalize >0 to zero. 
In order to estimate the parameters of the model assumptions regarding the distribution of
the unobserved variables are required.  Once these assumptions are made, the model can be
estimated using individual purchasing data or aggregate market data, which is more widely
available (for details of the estimation see the Appendix).
Possibly the simplest distributional assumptions one can make are those made in classical
discrete choice models: consumer heterogeneity enters the model only through the separable






If gijt is distributed i.i.d. with a Type I extreme value distribution, this is the well-known (Multi-
nominal) Logit model. 
The Logit model is appealing, due to its tractability, however it restricts the price
elasticities of demand in two ways.  First, a problem which has been stressed in the literature is
with the cross-price elasticities.  When a price of a brand increases the Logit model restricts18
consumers to substitute towards other brands in proportion to market shares, regardless of
characteristics.  In the context of RTE cereals this implies that if, for example, Quaker CapN
Crunch (a kids cereal) and Post Grape Nuts (a wholesome simple nutrition cereal) have similar
market shares, then the substitution from General Mills Lucky Charms (a kids cereal) toward
either of them will be the same.  Intuitively, if the price of one kids cereal goes up we would
expect more consumers to substitute to another kids cereal than to a nutrition cereal. 
An additional problem, that has received less attention, is that without allowing for
heterogeneity in the consumer price sensitivity own-price elasticities are determined by functional
form. If the price enters in a linear form, and the market share of most products is small, then
own-price elasticities will be almost exactly proportional to own price.  Therefore, the lower the
price the lower the elasticity (in absolute value), which implies that a standard pricing model
predicts a higher markup for the lower-priced brands.  This is possible only if the marginal cost
of a cheaper brand is lower (not just in absolute value, but as a percentage of price) than that of a
more expensive product.  For some products this will not be true. If, for example, price enters in
log form the implied elasticity would be roughly constant.  In other words, the functional form
directly determines the patterns of own-price elasticity.
The Nested Logit (McFadden, 1978) is a slightly more complex model in which the i.i.d.
extreme value assumption is replaced with a variance components structure.  All brands are
grouped into exhaustive and mutually exclusive sets.  A consumer has a common shock to all the
products in a set, so she is more likely to substitute to other products in the group.
The Nested Logit model allows for somewhat more flexible substitution patterns, yet
retains the computational simplicity of the Logit structure.  In many cases the a priori division of
products into groups, and the assumption of i.i.d. shocks within a group, will not be reasonable19
either because the division of segments is not clear or because the segmentation does not fully
account for the substitution patterns.  Furthermore, the Nested Logit model does not help with the
problem of own-price elasticities.  This is usually handled by assuming some "nice" functional
form, yet does not solve the problem of having the elasticities be driven by the functional form
assumption.
If in the full model, described by equations (4) and (5), we maintain the i.i.d. extreme
value distribution assumption. Now own-price elasticity will not necessarily be driven by
functional form: each individual will have a different price sensitivity, which will be averaged to
a mean price sensitivity using the individual specific probabilities of purchase as weights.  The
price sensitivity will be different for different brands.  Furthermore, the full model also allows for
flexible substitution patterns, which will be guided by the product characteristics.  Consumers
that stop purchasing a brand due to a price increase are more likely to switch to products with
similar characteristics rather than just proportionally to market shares.  By allowing one of the
characteristics to be the market segment of the brand, this model can take advantage of  a priori
segmentation of the market in a diffuse manner.
Unfortunately, these advantages do not come without cost.  Estimation of the full model 
is not as simple as that of the Logit or Nested Logit models (see the Appendix).
Comparing the Different Methods
In general the symmetric average consumer models are the least adequate for simulating
the effects of a merger.  The main weakness of these methods is in estimating the "closeness" of
the various products, which is the key measure for the analysis of a merger.  Despite this problem
the Logit model has been used frequently for merger analysis due to its tractability and ease of20
use (see Werden and Froeb, 1994). Unless time is a binding constraint these models should not be
used.
Choosing between the multi-stage budgeting approach and the random coefficients
discrete choice method is harder.  Both have advantages and weakness compared to each other. 
The multi-level model requires a priori segmentation of the market into relatively small groups,
which in some cases might be hard to define.  Second, as mentioned above the empirical
specification does not always meet the theoretical requirements.  Also, the derivation of the AIDS
assumes that there no corner solutions, i.e., all consumers consume all products.  When dealing
with broad categories like food and shelter, as in the original model of Deaton and Muellbuer
(1980a), this is a reasonable assumption. For differentiated products, however, it is rather
unlikely that all consumers consume all varieties. Finally, from the applied estimation point of
view it is harder to find exogenous instrumental variables, which explain the results found in
Nevo (1997a, Chapter 6). 
On the plus side this method has two clear advantages.  First, it is closer to classical
estimation methods and neo-classical theory, and therefore is easier and more intuitive to
understand.  An additional point, important for practitioners, is that the computation time is
lower.
Discrete choice models require characteristics of products, in general are more
computational intense, and  rely on distributional assumptions and functional forms. All these
problems are treated by innovations introduced in Nevo (1997b), and used below.  The latter
difficulty requires careful sensitivity analysis, which should not be a problem for careful
scientific work but might be a problem for analysis of mergers under time constraints. A full




is referred to Nevo (1997a, Chapter 6).
3.2 Step 2: Recovering Marginal Costs
In some rare cases marginal costs will be observed but in the typical case marginal costs
need to be recovered.  There are essentially two ways this can be done.  First, is to use the
estimated demand elasticities and a model of conduct in order to compute the marginal costs. 
Alternatively, the model of conduct could be estimated jointly with the marginal costs.  I discuss
both cases.
For simplicity of exposition I focus on a particular model of supply.  The analysis can be
generalized or changed to match the specifics of the market being considered. Formally, suppose
there are F firms, each of which produces some subset, ￿f , of the  j=1,...,J different brands.  The
profits of firm f are
where sj(p) is the market share of brand j, which is a function of the prices of all brands, M is the
size of the market, and Cf  are the fixed cost of production.  The market size defined here is
different than the one used in the standard analysis of mergers: it includes the share of the
"outside good".  This definition allows us to keep the market size fixed while still allowing the
total quantity of products sold to increase (since such an increase will result in a decrease in the
share of the outside good). 
Assuming: (1) the existence of a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices; and
(2) that the prices that support it are strictly positive; the price pj of any product j produced by
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These set of J equations imply price-costs margins for each good.  The markups can be solved for
explicitly by defining 
In vector notation the first order conditions become
This implies a markup equation 
or that estimated marginal costs are
Equation (8) can be used in one of two ways.  First, the estimates of the demand system
obtained in Step 1 can be plugged into equation (7) and used to compute the implied marginal
costs using equation (8).  Alternatively, one could define the elements of the S matrix as 
The parameters 2jr can be interpreted as conjectural variation parameters.  Note that the definition
given in equation (7) is a private case of the definition given in equation (9).  The extra
parameters in the latter equation can in principal be estimated jointly with the demand parameters
and possibly parameters that vary the marginal costs.  This estimation requires either a measure
of marginal costs or a specification of the variables that change these costs and a functional form
assumption.  In practice this estimation might be difficult to implement (see Nevo, 1997d).23
p (’ ˆ mc% post(p ()&1s(p (), (10)
3.3  Step 3: The Post-Merger Equilibrium
The final step is simulating the effects of the merger by computing the new equilibrium.
From a technical point of view this is the simplest part of the exercise, yet from the economic
point of view this is the hardest since it requires assumptions on various effects of the merger.  In
most cases the assumptions can be restricted to placing bounds on the possible variables (rather
than committing to a particular value) and thus obtaining bounds on the effects.
In order to simulate the new price equilibrium a model of post-merger price conduct is
required.  Here I assume the same model as the pre-merger conduct model specified in the
previous section.  The analysis is not constraint to having the same model, nor is it restricted to
the one presented here.  Let   be a matrix defined by using the demand estimates of Step 1 post
and the definition given in equation (7) using the post-merger structure of the industry, or the one
given by equation (9) using the estimated CV parameters with adjustments for the change of
ownership.  Therefore, the predicted post-merger equilibrium price,  , solves  p (
where   are the marginal costs predicted in Step 2, and p
* is the vector of post-merger predicted ˆ mc
equilibrium prices.
Note, that   and   use the same demand estimates and differ only in the ownership pre post
structure.  This does not imply that pre and post merger price elasticities are the same (since
elasticity might vary with price); however,  it is not consistent with the firms changing their
optimal strategy in other dimensions that influence demand.  For example, if as a result of the
merger the optimal level of advertising changes, and advertising influences  , then the Ms/Mp
estimate of the equilibrium price, using equation (10) will be wrong.  If one is willing to model
advertising, then the post-merger equilibrium levels of prices and advertising can be predicted12For example see Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994 equation 8); or Werden (1997 equation 1).
13For the results presented below I solved  using the MATLAB standard post(p ()((p (& ˆ mc)’s(p (),
algorithm for solving non-linear equations (fsolve.m).  This computation usually took several seconds on a
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jointly, using the first order conditions for both the decision variables and the same approach as
above.
An alternative to finding the price that solves the system of equations (10) is to use an
approximation used by previous work
12
where S are the pre-merger observed market shares.  Note that neither the market shares nor the
partial derivatives of demand are a function of prices.  Therefore, the prices defined by equation
(11) are only an approximation to the true predicted post-merger equilibrium prices given by
equation (10).  In principal, one could analytically characterize the relation between the two
vectors of prices, but in most cases computing the equilibrium prices is a standard problem of
solving a system of non-linear equations and can be easily achieved using standard software.
13
An additional shortcoming of previous simulations of mergers is that no attempt was made
at translating the predicted changes in prices into a welfare measure. A measure of a consumer’s
welfare is given by consumer surplus, or the area under each consumer’s demand curve. 
Trajtenberg (1989) shows that in the discrete choice model presented above, for each consumer
the consumer surplus is 
The total change in consumer welfare is obtained by aggregating over all the different consumers
the difference in consumer welfare.25
Modeling additional strategies used by firms, and estimating the implied policy functions, is
problematic if these strategies have long-run implications.  For example, suppose there is an
investment a firm can undertake today (e.g.,  introducing a new brand) that improves its
competitive position in the future.  The optimal investment decision is obtained from solving the
dynamic optimization problem of the firm.  Like the short-run, static, decisions, in most oligopoly
situations this optimal decision will be different with or without a merger.  In the long-run,
dynamic, case the difficulty is in estimating the parameters that influence this decision.  Pakes and
McGuire (1994) provide a strategy for computing a class of dynamic models that incorporate
investment together with entry and exit.  Estimation and simulation based on such models is the
focus of ongoing work.
4.  AN APPLICATION TO MERGERS IN THE CEREAL INDUSTRY
This section simulates the price changes that would result from mergers in the ready-to eat
cereal industry.  Four mergers are examined; two are actual mergers, and two are hypothetical. 
First, I analyze General Foods’ acquisition of the Nabisco cereal line (General Foods also owns
Post), and General Mills’ acquisition of Chex.  Next, I simulate hypothetical mergers between
Quaker Oats and Kellogg, and Quaker Oats and General Mills.  The choice of these two is by no
means suggestive and is meant only to demonstrate the model of the previous section. 
The ready-to-eat cereal industry is characterized by high concentration, high price-cost
margins, large advertising to sales ratios and aggressive introduction of new products.  For the
purposes of our analysis the most important feature of this industry is the high concentration on the
firm level.  Tables 1a-b display the market shares of the main players in this industry.
Concentration on the brand level is lower.  The top brands (General Mills Cheerios, Kellogg’s26
Corn Flakes and Frosted Flakes) will have a 5 percent market share and the smaller brands of the
list presented in Table 2 will have roughly a 1 percent market shares. A full description of this
industry is beyond the scope of this paper and can be found in Nevo (1997a chapter 1).
4.1 Estimation of Demand
The first step of the analysis described in the previous section is estimation of demand. 
Models from all the three classes described in Section 3.1 were explored, for reasons discussed
below only two are presented here.  The data and details of the estimation are described in the
Appendix.  The main results for these models are discussed below.
For each model the demand for 24 brands of cereal in 45 cities over 20 quarters was
estimated.  The set of products is presented in Table 2. For the purposes of this chapter, the
portfolio of a company will consist only of the products in this set.  Thus, a merger between Post
and Nabisco is actually a merger between Post Raisin Bran, Post Grape Nuts and Nabisco
Shredded Wheat.  Synergies with, and between, the other products of the two companies is
ignored.  I will discuss the importance of this assumption in each case.
Logit Demand
The first model explored is the Logit model, described by equation (6).  This is a discrete
choice model but as was pointed out in Section 3 it can be viewed as a symmetric representative
consumer model.  The main reason for exploring this model is the emphasis it has received in the
merger literature (see Werden and Froeb1994).
Table 3 presents results obtained by regressing the difference of the log of each brand’s
observed market share and the log of the share of the outside good,  ln(Sjt) - ln(S0t), on price,
advertising expenditures, brand and time dummy variables.  Column (i) displays the results of
ordinary least squares regression.  The coefficient on price and the implied own price elasticities27
are relatively low.  Since the Logit demand structure does not impose a constant elasticity, the
estimates imply a different elasticity for each brand-city-quarter combination.  Some statistics of
the distribution of the elasticities are shown in the bottom of the column. The low elasticities and
the high number of inelastic demands are not uncommon and are due to the endogenity of prices
discussed in the Appendix.
In order to deal with this endogenity two sets of instrumental variables were explored. 
Columns (ii) and (iv) present two stage least squares estimates using average regional prices as
instrumental variables.  These IV are valid under the assumptions given in the Appendix. 
Columns (iii) and (v) use proxies for marginal costs as IV in the same regression.  Finally,
column (vi) uses both sets of IV.  Columns (iv)-(vi) include controls for market demographics.
Three conclusions should be drawn from the results in Table 3.  First, once IV are used
the coefficient on price and the implied own-price elasticity increase, in absolute value.  This is
predicted by theory and holds in a wide variety of studies.  Second, there are reasons to doubt the
validity of the IV used to generate the results (see the Appendix for a discussion). The important
thing to take from these results is the similarity between estimates using the two sets of IV.  The
similarity between the coefficients does not promise the two sets of IV will produce identical
coefficients in different models or that these are valid IV, but it does give us some hope.  Finally,
the results demonstrate the importance of controlling for demographics and heterogeneity, which
the full model presented below does. 
Due to space limitations I limit my discussion to two implications of these results.  The
implied marginal costs are presented and discussed below.  Table 4 presents the implied estimates
of own- and cross-price elasticities.  There are two disturbing patterns in this table, both predicted
by theory and both due to the Logit functional form.  First, the own price elasticities, presented in14If price entered in a log form these elasticities would all be roughly equal.  Beyond the discussion of
what is the “correct” functional form, this is disturbing because arbitrary assumptions on functional forms will
determine a key result.
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the second column, are almost exactly linear in price.  This is due to the lack of heterogeneity in
the price coefficient and the fact that price enters in a linear form.
14  Second, the cross price
elasticities are forced to be equal, and for this reason we need only present one number for each
brand.   This is probably the main limitation of using the Logit model for merger analysis. The
implications of these constraints are discussed below.
Random Coefficients Discrete Choice Demand
Estimation of the random coefficients discrete choice model of demand, described by
equations (4) and (5), was performed using the same instrumental variables as in the previous
section.  The details of the estimation are given in the Appendix. The results of the estimation are
presented in Table 5.  The first column displays the means of the taste parameters, " and $. 
Coefficients on price and advertising are estimated with a GMM procedure, while the coefficients
on the physical characteristics come from a Minimum Distance regression of the GMM brand
dummy coefficients on product characteristics. The next five columns present the parameters that
measure heterogeneity in the population: standard deviations, interaction with log of income, log
of income squared, log of age, and a dummy variable that is equal to one if age is under eighteen. 
The means of the distribution of marginal utilities, $’s, are estimated by a Minimum
Distance procedure (see Appendix for details). Except for All-Family segment dummy variable, 
all coefficients are statistically significant.  For the average consumer, sugar has positive marginal
utility, while a "mushy" cereal and fiber have negative marginal utility.
The estimates of standard deviations of the taste parameters are non-significant at
conventional significance levels for all characteristics except for the Kids segment dummy15Probably the right way to think about this is that households with kids will be more price sensitive than
households without kids, everything else equal.
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variable.  Most interactions with demographics are significant.  Marginal utility from sugar
decreases with  income.  Marginal valuation of sogginess increases with income.  In other words,
wealthier (and possibly more health conscious) consumers are less sensitive to the crispness of a
cereal. In general these results are similar to those presented in Nevo (1997b), see there for a
detailed discussion of the results and the economic implications.
The results suggest that individual price sensitivity is heterogenous. The estimate of the
standard deviation is not statistically significant, suggesting that most of the heterogeneity is
explained by the demographics.  Consumers with above average income tend to be less price
sensitive as are adults.
15 Allowing the price coefficient to be a non-linear function of income is
important (see Nevo 1997b).  Further non-linearity was explored by adding additional powers of
income, but in general were found to be non-significant.
Once again, due to lack of space I limit the discussion of the results to the implied own-
and cross- price elasticities.  For a detailed discussion of results similar to the ones presented here
see Nevo (1997a).  Table 5 presents a sample of own- and cross-price elasticities implied by the
results of the full model. We note that the two problems of the Logit results are not present here. 
The own-price elasticities are not linear in price, despite the fact that price enters in a linear form. 
This is due to the heterogeneity in the price sensitivity: the consumers that purchase the different
products have different price sensitivity.  The problem with the cross-price elasticities is also not
present as explained in Section 3.1.
Additional Specifications and Sensitivity Analysis
Whenever the estimation relies on structural assumption it is important to verify that the
results are robust to changes in that structure.  The estimation results presented in the previous30
section are no different.  Several sensitivity assumptions were performed but due to limitations in
space are not presented here (for some of these see Nevo, 1997a).  Sensitivity to definition of key
variables (for example the share of the outside good), functional form (mainly in the interaction
with demographics) and distributional assumptions, was performed.  The results presented here
were found to be robust.
The main alternative method to the one used in the previous section is the multi-level
demand system presented in Section 3.  A comparison of the results presented here has both a
methodological interest and a practical interest, since these methods have been used to evaluate
some recent mergers.  Such a comparison is beyond the scope of this paper, but can be found in
Nevo (1997a Chapter 6).  Using the same data as in this paper I find there that the multi-level
demand system yields, for this industry, somewhat disturbing cross-price elasticities.  Some of
the cross-price elasticities are estimated to be negative, which through adding up constraints
allows other elasticities to be positive but very large.  Furthermore, this "wrong" sign occurs most
often for those products that we believe are close substitutes (for example between Post and
Kellogg Raisin Bran).  If used in the analysis below this would yield peculiar results (for example
if Post and Kellogg merged then the price of both Post and Kellogg’s Raisin Bran would
decrease). This phenomenon is not limited just to our data and appears also in Hausman (1996). 
It however might be limited to specifics of the RTE cereal industry, since it does not seem to
happen in the studies of Hausman, Leonard and Zona (1994) and Ellison et al. (1997).  Study of
these differences is the subject of ongoing work.
4.2 Recovering Marginal Costs
Marginal costs are recovered by assuming a pre-merger Nash-Bertrand equilibrium, as
described in the Section 3.2.  In order for the simulations below to make sense, demand was16Strictly speaking the “simple” Logit model used here was not used, rather the Antitrust Logit or the
Nested Logit (see Werden and Froeb 1994).  Although these models improve on many of the problems of the Logit
model the results will be similar to those presented below.
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calibrated to the observed levels.  This insures that the simulated merger results are comparable to
a no-merger situation.  Or in other words, the simulated price increase without a merger will equal
the observed price.  In models without explicit heterogeneity in the individual probability of
purchasing a brand (for example the Logit model) this calibration can be preformed by adding a
“residual” to the predicted market shares.  However, in models with explicit heterogeneity, like the
model used here, this procedure can cause predicted individual probabilities of purchase to be
negative.  Therefore, the calibration was performed by adding the residual from the estimation
directly to the indirect utility given in equation (4).  The predicted marginal costs are displayed in
Table 7.
The results for the Logit model are somewhat strange.  The markup (price minus marginal
cost) is equal for all brands of the same firm.  This is a direct result of the restrictions of the Logit
model and has nothing to do with reality.  In other words, margins predicted by the Logit model
decrease with price: the lower the price the higher the margin. The full model allows for
heterogeneity in the marginal valuation of the brands and therefore frees the restrictions that cause
this behavior.  Indeed, both the marginal costs and the margin seem more reasonable.
4.3 Computing Post-Merger Equilibrium
For the post merger behavior four different situations were examined.  First, I examine the
model used in previous work in which instead of computing the new price equilibrium the
approximation given in equation (11) was used. I use this assumption with the Logit estimates of
demand and the estimates from the full model.  The Logit model is similar to that used in much of
previous work and therefore this can be used as a baseline comparison.
16  Using this model of17Ralston is the only one of the national manufacturers that produces private label cereals, and is the
largest producer of such brands.
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computation with the full model of demand splits the difference between the procedure proposed
here and the baseline comparison into two: that which is due to the estimates of demand and that
which is due to fully computing the post-merger equilibrium.  The next procedure examined uses
the estimates from the full model of demand to compute the new Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. 
Finally, I examine the latter procedure and assume an arbitrary 5 percent reduction in marginal
costs for merging firms.
All computations are based on the demand estimates presented in Table 5.  The post-
merger equilibrium was computed for each of the 45 cities in the sample using the data of the last
quarter of 1992.  Tables 8-11 present the median percent increase in prices over all cities.
In 1992, Kraft, which owns Post, acquired the Nabisco cereal line.  This merger was
challenged by the state of New-York, and was approved by the court.  The main argument of the
state was that the high level of substitution between Post Grape Nuts and Nabisco Shredded
Wheat will cause an increase in the price of these products, if the merger is approved.  The merger
between these firms was simulated and the results are presented in Table 8.  For this merger, either
way of computing the post-merger equilibrium results in a small predicted price increase.  If the
merger generates cost efficiencies then it might actually lead to a reduction in price. Given the
small production scale of Nabisco before the merger, a 5 percent cost reduction is not totally
unreasonable. 
In August of 1996 General Mills purchased from Ralston the Chex cereal line.  This
marked a change in the strategy of Ralston that decided to concentrate on its private label
cereals.
17  This merger was not challenged.  The increase in price is computed and presented in33
Table 9. Unlike before the procedure used to compute the equilibrium changes the result. 
Computing the new equilibrium results in an increase in the price of Chex that is nearly twice the
increase computed from the approximation. Furthermore, we see a result that will become even
more striking below: the simulations based on the Logit model are not even close to the “true”
answer.  
These results raise the question: does a price increase of this magnitude justify regulatory
intervention?  It is not clear how to answer this question without a clear model of what the
decision makers’ loss function is, an issue I will return to below.
For this merger there are potentially other considerations that can counter balance the price
increase.  Ralston will now concentrate on its private label business, and through that will supply
what seems to be the main check of the price of branded cereal. In the results presented here this
effect was not incorporated, but if the set of products for which we estimated demand included
generic brands we could in principle capture this effect. 
The last two mergers considered are between Quaker Oats (or its three brands in the
sample) and either Kellogg or General Mills.  Both of these are hypothetical mergers and are used
only in order to demonstrate the method proposed here.  The results from simulating these thought
experiments can be seen in Tables 10 and 11.
Like the previous merger the predicted price increase differs between the full computation
and the approximation.  We note though that the difference here is smaller than before and it is not
necessarily monotonic.  Now the Logit results are very far from the truth, which is not surprising. 
Due to the symmetry assumption embodied in the Logit model simulation essentially counts how
many products each firm has, it does not take account of any true measure of distance between
products in some attribute space.  All the results are telling us is that the portfolios of either34
Kellogg or General Mills are much closer to the portfolio of Quaker Oats than what is suggested
by the Logit model.
The results in Tables 8-11 demonstrate the effect of a merger on prices.  However, they do
not give any indication to whether these price changes are large or not.  The right measure in
which to answer this question is the influence of the merger on welfare.  The results presented in
Table 12 use equation (12), and a sample of individuals from the CPS to derive changes in
consumer surplus, profits and total welfare.
5.  DISCUSSION
This paper presented an approach to simulating price equilibria, and its implications for
social welfare, that result from a merger.  The approach was used to examine four mergers in the
ready-to-eat cereal industry: two real and two hypothetical.  Two methodological conclusions can
be drawn from the results.  First, the model used for the front-end estimation of demand is
important in determining the results of the simulation.  Specifically, the Logit model and its close
relatives that have been used in some previous work are problematic.  Second, the approximation
used in previous work differ in some cases substantially from the “true” predicted price
equilibrium.
The simulations in the previous section assume that the merger is between the brands of the
merging firms included in the sample.  In order to fully simulate the effects of a merger all the
brands of the merging firms should be included.  This is potentially important since the true gains
from the mergers might be in the synergies between these brands, both on the demand and supply
side.  Using the model of demand presented here this is not a problem.
There could potentially be other dimensions of non-price competition between the firms in35
the industry, for example advertising and brand introduction.  The analysis in this paper does not
take into account any post-merger changes in the behavior in these dimensions.  For example,
merging firms might change the number of new brands, and the way they introduce them.  This
change might have two effects: a direct effect on consumer welfare, and an indirect effect on long-
run prices.  The direct effect might be to increase (decrease) consumer welfare by more (less)
variety.  However, the long-run effect might be to create a barrier to entry (Schmalensee, 1978),
thus, supporting higher long-run prices.  In order to determine if these effects exist, or which
dominates, we need a dynamic model of brand introduction in the industry,
Potentially these non-price dimensions could be introduced into the analysis by simulating
the effects a merger would have on the policy functions determining these strategies.  However, an
empirical model of dynamic decisions, such as advertising and brand introduction, is beyond
current knowledge.  The algorithm offered by Pakes and McGuire (1994) is promising, and is the
basis for work in progress that addresses these issues.36
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Connecticut, for making these data available.
19Most of IRI’s definition of cities are similar, but not identical, to MSA’s.
20This was done by using the serving weight suggested by the manufacturer, which are assumed correct
(or at least proportional to the “true” serving weight).
21Therefore, the total market size is defined as  *population*365/4, with   is assumed equal to 1. 
Alternatively,   can be estimated.
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DATA AND ESTIMATION APPENDIX
Data
Market shares and prices were obtained from the IRI Infoscan Data Base at the University
of Connecticut.
18  These data were collected by Information Resources, Inc. (IRI), a marketing
firm in Chicago, using scanning devices in a national random sample of supermarkets located in
various size metropolitan areas and rural towns.  Weekly data for UPC-coded products are drawn
from a sample which represents the universe of supermarkets with annual sales of more than $2
million dollars, accounting for 82% of grocery sales in the US. In the Infoscan Data Base the data
are aggregated by brand (for example different size boxes are considered one brand), city
19 and
quarter. The data covers up to 45 different cities (the exact number increases over time), and
ranges from the first quarter of 1988 to the last quarter of 1992.
Market shares are defined by converting volume sales into number of servings sold,
20 and
dividing by the total potential number of servings in a city in a quarter.  This potential was
assumed to be one serving per capita per day.
21  The outside good market share was defined as the
residual between one and the sum of the observed market shares.
A price variable was created by dividing the dollar sales by the number of servings sold,
and was deflated using a regional urban consumers CPI. The dollar sales reflect the price paid by
consumers at the cashier, generating an average real per serving transaction price.  However, the22The sources include: magazines, Sunday magazines, newspapers, outdoor, network television, spot
television, syndicated television, cable networks, network radio and national spot radio.
23I wish to thank Sandy Black for suggesting this variable and helping me classify the various brands.
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sales data does not account for any coupons used post purchase. If coupons are used evenly across
brands this is not a problem; otherwise the results are potentially biased. One should keep in mind
that the data are from a period when coupons were issued less frequently than they are today.
The Infoscan data was matched with a few other sources.  First, advertising data was
taken from the Leading National Advertising data base, which contains quarterly national
advertising expenditures by brand collected from 10 media sources.
22  I used only the total of the
10 types of media. 
Product characteristics were collected in local supermarkets by examining cereal boxes. 
This implicitly assumes that the characteristics have not changed since 1988.  Although this is not
exactly true, it seems a reasonable first approximation.  Each cereal  was classified into "mushy"
or not, depending on its sogginess in milk.
23  There might be some measurement error in this
classification.
Information on the distribution of demographics was obtained by sampling individuals
from the March Current Population Survey for each year.  Individual income was obtained by
dividing household income by the size of the household.
Finally, instrumental variables were constructed using two additional data sources.  An
average of wages paid in the supermarket sector in each city was constructed from the NBER
CPS Monthly Earning Extracts.  Estimates of city density were taken from the BLS, as were
regional price indices.  
Estimation
I now describe how the discrete choice model described in the paper was estimated. Only24The reasons for names will be apparent below.
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jt’ xj & pjt% j% jt,µ ijt’[pjt,xj](( Di% vi)
(13)
Ajt(x,p.t, .t; 2)’ (Di,vi, it)|uijt$uilt Øl’0,1,...,J
the basic ideas are given.  The reader is referred to Nevo (1997c) for details. The essential idea is
to aggregate the individual model of demand described by equations (4) and (5) to generate a
predicted aggregate demand, which is a function of the parameters to be estimated.  The
parameters are chosen so to minimize the distance between the prediction and the observed
demand.  Since we observe aggregate demand for several markets (900 city-quarter
combinations, to be precise) and the distribution of the individual characteristics that govern this
demand vary between the markets, we are able to estimate the individual demand parameters.  In
constructing the measure of distance between observed and predicted shares I  follow the
suggestion of Berry (1994) to construct a GMM estimator, which controls for the endogenity of
prices.  
Formally, combining (4) and (5) we get
where   is a (K+1)×1 vector, 2 = (21, 22) is a vector containing all the parameters of the [pjt, xj]
model.  The vector  21=(",$) contains the linear parameters and the vector 22=(A, E, B0, F0) the
non-linear parameters
24.  The utility is now expressed as the mean utility, represented by *jt, and a
mean zero heteroskedastic deviation from that mean, µijt + gijt, that captures the effects of the
random coefficients.  
Consumers are assumed to purchase one unit of the good that gives the highest utility.
This implicitly defines the set of unobserved variables that lead to the choice of good j.  Let this
set be 43
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where x are the characteristics of all brands,  . Assuming p.t’(p1t,....,pJt)) and .t’( 1t,...., Jt))
ties occur with zero probability, the market share of the jth product, as a function of the mean
utility levels of all the J+1 goods, given the parameters, is 
where P
*(@) denotes population distribution functions.  The second equality is a direct application
of Bayes rule, while the last is a consequence of the modeling assumptions made in (4) and (5).
By making distributional assumptions on the unobserved quantities we can solve the
integral in (14).  For the results presented in this paper I assume that g is distributed extreme
value, v is distributed as a multi-variate normal, and D is distributed according to the non-
parametric empirical distribution (sampled from the CPS).  The assumption of extreme value is
innocent (given that v and D have non-degenerate distributions) and is made for computational
convenience.  The normality assumption is not innocent in theory but in practice will not alter our
results (see Nevo 1997b).  Finally, equation (4) makes functional form assumption.  The results
of exploration of flexible functional forms are presented in Nevo (1997a).  
Let Z =[z1,...,zM] be a set of instruments such that 
where T, a function of the model parameters, is an "error term" defined below and 2
* denotes the
"true" value of these parameters.  The GMM estimate is
where A is a consistent estimate of  .  Following Berry (1994), the "error term" is not E[Z ) )Z]25See for example Berry (1994), BLP (1995), Berry, Carnall, and Spiller (1994), Bresnahan, Stern and
Trajtenberg (1996).
26I.e., A=Z’Z, which is the “optimal” weight matrix under the assumption of homoscadestic errors.
44
s.t .t; 2 ’S.t .
jt’ jt(S.t; 2)&(xj % pjt). (17)
defined as the difference between the observed and predicted market shares; rather it is defined as
the structural error term in equation (4), )>jt. In order to obtain a moment function that is linear in
this term we invert the market share function to obtain the vector of mean valuations that equates
the observed market shares to the predicted shares.  This is done by solving, for each market, the
implicit system of equations 
In some cases (for example, the Logit model and one level Nested Logit) this can be solved
analytically.  However, for the full model suggested above, this has to be done numerically. 
Once this inversion has been done, either analytically or numerically, the "error term" is defined
as 
Note, that it is the observed market shares, S, that enter this equation.  Also, we can now see the
reason for distinguishing between 21 and 22: 21 enters this term, and the GMM objective, in a
linear fashion, while 22 enters non-linearly. 
Usually in these types of models
25, the error term, as defined by (17), is the unobserved
product characteristic, >j.  However, due to the richness of my data I am able to include a brand
dummy as a regressor.  This dummy includes both the mean quality index of observed
characteristics,  , and the unobserved characteristics, >j.  Thus, the error term is the city-quarter xj
specific deviation from the main valuation, i.e., )>jt.  The inclusion of a brand dummy introduces
a challenge in estimating the taste parameters, $, which is dealt with below.
In the Logit and Nested Logit models, with the appropriate choice of a weight matrix
26 ,45
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this procedure simplifies to two-stage least squares.  In the full random coefficients model, both
the computation of the market shares, and the "inversion" in order to get  , have to be done jt(@)
numerically.  The value of the estimate is computed using a non-linear search. For the details of
the computation see Nevo (1997c).
Instruments
The key identifying assumption in the algorithm previously given is equation (15), which
requires a set of exogenous instruments.  The first set that comes to mind are the instruments
defined by ordinary least squares, namely the dependent variables (or more generally the
projections of the derivatives, of the non-linear objective function with respect to the parameters,
on to the dependent variables).  In order to determine the validity of this assumption we examine
the pricing decision.  Prices are a function of marginal costs and a markup term,
This can be decomposed into a national component (that does not vary by city and quarter), and a
deviation from this national mean.  As pointed out, once a brand dummy is included in the
regression, the error term is the unobserved city-quarter specific deviation from the national time
mean valuation of the brand.  Since we assume that players in the industry observe and account
for this deviation, it will influence the market specific markup term and bias the estimate of price
sensitivity, ", towards zero. 
Different sets of instrumental variables have been proposed and tried in the literature. 
Elsewhere I compared these different IV (see Nevo 1997b).  Based on that comparison, in this
paper I exploit the panel structure of the data.  The identifying assumption is that, controlling for
brand specific means and demographics, city specific valuations are independent across cities (but27This assumption is similar to the one made in Hausman (1996), although our setups differ substantially.
28There is no claim made here with regards to the “optimality” of these instruments. A potentially
interesting question might be are there other ways of weighting the information from different cities.
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are allowed to be correlated within a city over time)
27.  Given this assumption, the prices of the
brand in other cities are valid instruments; from (18) we see that prices of brand j in two cities
will be correlated due to the common marginal cost, but due to the independence assumption will
be uncorrelated with market specific valuation. Potentially, one could use the prices in all other
cities and all quarters as instruments.  I use regional quarterly average prices (excluding the city
being instrumented) from all quarters.
28  
There are several plausible situations in which the independence assumption will not hold
(see Nevo ,1997b).  Therefore, I explore a set of direct proxies for marginal costs. Marginal costs
include production (materials, labor and energy), packaging, and distribution costs.  Direct
production and packaging costs exhibit little variation, and are too small a percentage of marginal
costs, to be correlated with prices.  Also, except for small variations over time, a brand dummy
variable, which is included as one of the regressors, proxies for these costs.  The last component
of marginal costs, distribution costs, includes: costs of transportation, shelf space, and labor. 
These are proxied by region dummy variables, which pick up transportation costs; city density,
which is a proxy for the difference in the cost of space; and average city earning in the
supermarket sector computed from the CPS Monthly Earning Files. 
Fixed Brand Effects
The empirical specification includes a brand dummy variable as one on the product
characteristics.  This variable captures the effects of all brand characteristics, observed and
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endogenity problem (by controlling for some of the unobserved quality).  In order to recover the
mean taste for any observed characteristic that is fixed between markets a minimum distance
procedure is used (as in Chamberlain, 1982).
Let d=(d1, ..., dJ )’ denote the J×1 vector of brand dummy coefficients, X be the J×K
(K<J) matrix of product characteristics, and >=(>1, ..., >J)’ be the J×1 vector of unobserved
product qualities.  Then from (4)
The estimates of $ and > are
where  , is the vector of coefficients estimated from the procedure described in the previous ˆ d
section, and S is the variance-covariance matrix of these estimates.  The coefficients on the brand
dummies provide an "unrestricted" estimate of the mean utility.  The minimum distance estimates
project these estimates onto a lower dimensional space, which is implied by a "restricted" model
that sets > to zero.  Chamberlain provides a P
2  test to evaluate these restrictions. 48
TABLE 1A
VOLUME MARKET SHARES
88Q1 88Q4 89Q4 90Q4 91Q4 92Q4
Kellogg 41.39 39.91 38.49 37.86 37.48 33.70
General Mills 22.04 22.30 23.60 23.82 25.33 26.83
Post 11.80 10.30 9.45 10.96 11.37 11.31
Quaker Oats 9.93 9.00 8.29 7.66 7.00 7.40
Ralston 4.86 6.37 7.65 6.60 5.45 5.18
Nabisco 5.32 6.01 4.46 3.75 2.95 3.11
C3 75.23 72.51 71.54 72.64 74.18 71.84
C6 95.34 93.89 91.94 90.65 89.58 87.53
Private Label 3.33 3.75 4.63 6.29 7.13 7.60
Source: IRI Infoscan Data Base, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Center.
TABLE 1B
SALES MARKET SHARES
88Q1 88Q4 89Q4 90Q4 91Q4 92Q4
Kellogg 41.23 39.84 38.16 37.26 36.00 32.57
General Mills 24.73 25.16 26.86 27.70 29.66 31.39
Post 11.15 9.87 8.76 10.56 11.19 10.97
Quaker Oats 9.46 8.54 8.26 7.30 6.89 6.94
Ralston 5.12 6.61 7.80 7.03 5.78 5.45
Nabisco 5.00 5.59 4.13 3.58 3.04 3.33
C3 77.11 74.87 73.78 75.52 76.85 74.93
C6 96.69 95.61 93.97 93.43 92.56 90.65
Private Label 2.12 2.30 2.81 3.74 4.28 4.55
Source: IRI Infoscan Data Base, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Center.49
TABLE 2
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RESULTS FROM LOGIT DEMAND
(21,600 OBSERVATIONS)
OLS IV
























































2 -- 94.5 94.4 94.5 94.5 94.7
F-statistic -- 5179 6740 5046 6483 4959
Instruments:




-- -- T -- TT
Mean -1.71 -2.51 -2.51 -3.31 -3.38 -3.62
Std. 0.51 0.75 0.75 0.99 1.01 1.09
Median -1.60 -2.36 -2.36 -3.11 -3.18 -3.41
% of Inelastic
Demands (+/- 2 s.e.’s)
4.4%
(4.1-4.9%)
00 0 0 0
Dependant variable is ln(Sjt)-ln(S0t). All regressions include time and brand dummy variables, robust standard errors
are given in parenthesis.
aAdjusted R
2 for the OLS regression, and a test of over identification for the IV regressions (Hausman, 1983) with
the 0.95 critical values in parenthesis.51
TABLE 4
OWN AND CROSS PRICE ELASTICITIES IMPLIED BY LOGIT DEMAND
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aGives the percent change in market share of brand  j with a one percent change in price of  i, where i indexes row
and jßi.  The Logit functional form implies that these elasticities are equa l for all jßi.52
TABLE 5 







Interactions with Demographic Variables:
























































































































Except where noted, parameters are GMM estimates. All regressions include brand and time dummy variables.
Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis.
a Estimates from a minimum distance procedure.53
TABLE 6
 MEDIAN OWN AND CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITIES














Q Life Chex Shredded
Wheat
1 K Corn Flakes -3.002 0.048 0.434 0.055 0.000 0.013 0.001 0.004 0.003 0.002
2 K Raisin Bran 0.049 -2.899 0.074 0.202 0.008 0.158 0.049 0.018 0.010 0.047
3 K Frosted Flakes 0.318 0.049 -3.116 0.067 0.013 0.016 0.003 0.049 0.006 0.004
4 K Rice Krispies 0.023 0.059 0.046 0.106 0.012 0.027 0.025 0.013 0.019 0.019
5 K Frosted Mini Wheats 0.000 0.052 0.002 0.055 0.016 0.033 0.048 0.008 0.008 0.022
6 K Froot Loops 0.001 0.010 0.027 0.021 0.077 0.005 0.012 0.032 0.006 0.005
7 K Special K 0.210 0.072 0.208 0.106 0.003 0.024 0.021 0.011 0.011 0.024
8 K NutriGrain 0.440 0.122 0.264 0.120 0.001 0.043 0.017 0.008 0.005 0.025
9 K Crispix 0.005 0.035 0.018 0.077 0.014 0.017 0.023 0.010 0.018 0.015
10 K Cracklin Oat Bran 0.001 0.053 0.004 0.120 0.012 0.026 0.031 0.011 0.010 0.013
11 GM Cheerios 0.037 0.126 0.064 -2.420 0.010 0.060 0.036 0.019 0.017 0.031
12 GM Honey Nut Cheerios 0.002 0.018 0.060 0.036 0.076 0.009 0.015 0.049 0.007 0.008
13 GM Wheaties 0.816 0.120 0.387 0.122 0.001 0.037 0.004 0.008 0.005 0.007
14 GM Total 0.209 0.060 0.211 0.104 0.003 0.018 0.017 0.011 0.011 0.019
15 GM Lucky Charms 0.001 0.012 0.031 0.025 -1.348 0.006 0.013 0.035 0.006 0.006
16 GM Trix 0.001 0.009 0.030 0.026 0.071 0.004 0.010 0.034 0.007 0.004
17 GM Raisin Nut 0.037 0.146 0.064 0.214 0.009 0.061 0.023 0.020 0.015 0.019
18 P Raisin Bran 0.027 0.324 0.050 0.194 0.008 -2.878 0.057 0.017 0.009 0.052
19 P Grape Nuts 0.002 0.076 0.008 0.086 0.013 0.043 -2.307 0.010 0.010 0.070
20 Q 100% Natural 0.006 0.068 0.015 0.155 0.012 0.031 0.025 0.014 0.013 0.014
21 Q Life 0.011 0.048 0.198 0.080 0.058 0.021 0.018 -1.931 0.009 0.013
22 Q CapNCrunch 0.003 0.020 0.083 0.041 0.074 0.009 0.013 0.054 0.008 0.007
23 Chex 0.010 0.032 0.029 0.084 0.012 0.014 0.019 0.011 -1.684 0.013
24 N Shredded Wheat 0.005 0.122 0.018 0.130 0.009 0.067 0.119 0.012 0.010 -3.036
25 Outside good 0.101 0.050 0.079 0.072 0.010 0.023 0.020 0.010 0.010 0.015
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The columns labeled approx refer to the prices that result from computing the prices using the approximation given
in equation (11) Since nothing changes for the non-merging firms the price increase will always be zero, and
therefore is not displayed.  The column labeled “new equilibrium” computes the new Nash-Bertrand equilibrium
and the column labeled “cost reduction” does the same but assumes a 5% reduction in marginal costs for all brands
of merging firms.56
TABLE 9
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The columns labeled approx refer to the prices that result from computing the prices using the approximation given
in equation (11) Since nothing changes for the non-merging firms the price increase will always be zero, and
therefore is not displayed.  The column labeled “new equilibrium” computes the new Nash-Bertrand equilibrium
and the column labeled “cost reduction” does the same but assumes a 5% reduction in marginal costs for all brands
of merging firms.57
TABLE 10
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The columns labeled approx refer to the prices that result from computing the prices using the approximation given
in equation (11) Since nothing changes for the non-merging firms the price increase will always be zero, and
therefore is not displayed.  The column labeled “new equilibrium” computes the new Nash-Bertrand equilibrium
and the column labeled “cost reduction” does the same but assumes a 5% reduction in marginal costs for all brands
of merging firms.58
TABLE 11
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The columns labeled approx refer to the prices that result from computing the prices using the approximation given
in equation (11) Since nothing changes for the non-merging firms the price increase will always be zero, and
therefore is not displayed.  The column labeled “new equilibrium” computes the new Nash-Bertrand equilibrium
and the column labeled “cost reduction” does the same but assumes a 5% reduction in marginal costs for all brands
of merging firms.59
TABLE 12













Consumer Surplus -10.86 -35.82 -222.25 -416.70
Profits (total)
   Kellogg
   General Mills
   Post
   Quaker Oats
   Ralston





























Total Welfare -5.82 -27.42 -131.95 -258.22
with 5% reduction in mc:
Consumer Surplus 8.64 20.54 -176.68 -357.52
Profits (total)
   Kellogg
   General Mills
   Post
   Quaker Oats
   Ralston





























Total Welfare 29.24 78.23 -26.22 -147.97
All computations are based on results of Tables 8-11.